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PEoPLE

v.

PEETE

[28 C.2d

[Crim. No. 4673. In Bank. June 7,1946.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LOUISE PEE'fE, Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Other Crimes. - Except when it
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence that is relevant
is not excluded because it reveals the commission of an offense
other than that charged.
[2J 1I0micfde-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Evidence of defendant's
conduct in connection with a prior murder, which was similar
in significant respects to her conduct in connection with the
murder charged, was admissible to prove that the murder
charged was committed in the execution of a scheme or plan
to acquire property by murder.
[8] ld. - Instructions - Motive.-In a murder case in which the
court had admitted in evidence the circumstances surrounding
a previous murder for which defendant had been convicted,
the court properly instructed the jury that those circumstances, which showed that the purpose of the prior offense
was to acquire the victim's property, tended to pruve that
defendant had a motive for the second murder and served
to rebut the defense that decedent had been killed by her
husband.
[4J ld.-Instructions-ldentity.-In a murder case in which the
court had admitted in evidence the circumstances surrounding a previous murder for which defendant had been convicted, the court properly instructed the jury that those cirCUUlstances tended to identify defendant as the perpetrator
of the murder charged, especially where the murderer's method
of killing was the same in both cases.
[5] ld. - Evidence - Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for murder,
evidence concerning defendant's explanation of her unusual
conduct in connection with a previous murder, which explanation aided in het conviction of that murder, was admissible as
tenning to prove the falsity of her present explanation that her
similar unusual conduct was designed to obviate suspicion that
might be engendered by her criminal record.
(2J See 13 Cal.Jur. 704; 26 Am..Jv. 39B.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [2] Homicide, §103; [3] Homicide, §179; [4] Homicide, §193; [5] Homicide, § 102; [6J Criminal Law, § 1469; [7] Witnesses, § 232(1);
(B] Criminal Law, § 13B2 (14); [9] Witnesses, § 232(4); [10J Crinlinal Law, § 1377; [11] Homicide, § 107.
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[6] Criminal Law-Successive Crimes-Proceedings Where Prior
Convictions Admitted.-Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1093, which prohibit the reading of or alluding to an admitted charge of a
previous conviction, were not designed to exclude relevant
evidence nor to prevent impeachment of 1\ witness by proof
of conviction of a felony.
[1] Witnesses-Impeachment-Conviction of Felony-Proof. - In
a prosecution for murder, the judgment roll of a prior trial
in which defendant was convicted of murder was admissible
in evidenee to impeach ber testimony. (Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 2051.)

[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Rarmless and Reversible Error-Evidence.-In a prosecution for murder in which defendant admitted a prior conviction of murder, she was not prejudiced by
the introduction of the record of proceedings preceding the
previous judgment where the record of those proceedings
added little to the information related in the judgment.
[9] Witnesses-Impeachment-Conviction of Felony-Cross-examination of Accused.-In a prosecution for murder the fact that
a previous conviction of murder was affirmed on appeal may
be shown by eross-examination of defendant to impeach her.
(Code Civ. Proc., ~ 2051.)
[10] Criminal Law - Appeal- Harmless and Reversible ErrorWitnesses-Cross-examination.-In a prosecution for murder
in which defendant admitted a prior conviction of murder,
any error in cross-examining defendant concerning her statement that she was prevented by force from testifying in the
prior prosecution could not have been prejudicial where her
testimony tended to rnitiJrate the effect of the prior conviction.
[11] Romicide-Evidence-Rearsay-Declarations of Deceased.In a murder case, deceased's verified petition, executed in connection with her husband's commitment to an institution for
the insane, was hearsay and inadmissible to prove the truth
of recitals that he had threatened to kill deceased and himself.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code. § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and from an order denying a new trial. Harold
B. Landreth, Judge. Affirmed.
[6]8ee 8 Oal.Jur. 646; 26 Am.Jur. 400.
[9] Right to cross-examine accused as to previous prosecution
for, or conviction of, crime, for purpose of affecting his credibility,
Dote, 6 A.L.R. 1608 j 25 ld. 339,
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing death penalty affirmed.
Frederic H. Vercoe, Public Defender, and William B.
Neeley, Deputy Public Defender, for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards,
Deputy Attorney General, Fred N. Howser, District Attorney,
and John Barnes, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-An information was filed against defendant by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County,
charging her with the murder of Margaret R. Logan. The
jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree
and made no recommendation as to punishment. Defendant
admitted a charge of a previous conviction of murder and
serving a term therefor. The trial court denied her motion for a new trial. This appeal is automatic from the
judgment imposing the death penalty.
Defendant was convicted in 1921 of the murder of Jacob C.
Denton. On June 2, 1920, approximately two weeks after.
defendant had leased his residence, Denton disappeared. Defendant answered inquiries as to his whereabouts with various
statements: that he had been shot in the arm by an unknown
"Spanish woman"; that he was avoiding his residence because
he was ashamed of his wound; that his arm had been ampu·
tated; that he had gone to one or another part of the country;
that he wanted to conceal his affairs from his family and acquaintances. She also stated that he had given her a bill of
sale to his automobile; that he permitted her to open his mail;
that he atuhorized her to sell his house and accept the :first
payment. Defendant rented the Denton residence to a third
party, forged Jacob Denton's name to a lease,had deiilings-----for the sale of the residence, drew forged checks against
Denton's bank account, attempted to gain entrance to his
safety deposit box, went through his papers, pawned his diamond rings, explaining that she gave the proceeds to the
"Spanish w()man," gave away some of his clothing and had
some made over for her daughter, and attempted to discourage
search for him. On September 23, 1920, Denton's body was
found buried under his residence. A bullet had entered the
back of the neck at the fourth cervical vertebra and severed
the spinal cord. causing instant death. The decomposed state
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of the body indicated that be was killed about the time
of his disappearance. Although defendant did not testify,·
she made a lengthy explanation to a deputy district attorney of her conduct after Denton's disappearance, which
was discredited.
Following her conviction, defendant spent eighteen years
in the state penitentiary. During and following her imprisonment, she told a number of persons that she expected to
acquire a valuable estate or "trust fund" in the near f'lture.
The evidence shows that these statements were false, aud that
defendant was impecunious. The evidence also indicates that
after her release in 1939 she procured a revolver by theft.
In November, 1943, she was engaged by Mrs. Logan, whom
she had known many years, for domestic service and care of
Arthur Logan, who was then 73 years of age and in a state
of senile dementia. Arthur Logan was committed to an institution for the insane early in November, 1943, on petition
filed by his wife. Defendant aided Mrs. Logan in securing
this commitment. Mrs. Logan regretted her action and he was
paroled later that month to her care. Mrs. Logan gave defendant two letters in November, 1943, for use in connection
with her husband's release, which stated that defendant was
her "foster sister." Defendant retained these letters until
they were found on her person at the time of her arrest
thirteen months later.
.
.
On March 19, 1944, Mrs. Logan placed her husband in a
private sanitarium for one week. The records of the sanitarium reveal that Mr. Logan was unruly and noisy on occasions, but was not dangerously violent. Testimony was
given that Mrs. Logan's purpose in placing him in the
sanitarium was to have him cared for while she worked at
an aircraft factory.
Before Mrs. Logan's'death on May 29,1944, defendant purported to finance through a trust fund a $50,000 real estate
purchase by herself and Mrs. Logan, the property to be held
in joint tenancy. She failed to Qbtain the $2,000 escrow deposit, and the decedent procured the sum by pledging her
savings account. After Mrs. Logan's death, the escrow period
expired with the purchase price remaining unpaid, and defendant obtained one half of the deposit by forging the
decedent's name to an instrument giving defendant the power
of attorney for decedent. Earlier, on May 19, 1944, defendant
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forged a check for $200 drawn on Mrs. Logan's checking
account, and deposited the check in an account held jointly
with her husband. A cashier, however, discovered the forgery
and notified Mrs. Logan, who directed him to charge the sum
to her account and reassured him that the forger would repay
the obligation. Defendant wal> unable to do so, however, until
two days after Mrs. Logan'8 death, when she made partial
payment with funds appropriated from a refund of money
paid for railroad ticket8 by decedent.
On May 2, 1944, defendant secretly married and moved to a
nearby hotel. She did not reveal her criminal record to her
husband. She told severa] people during that month that Mr.
Logan was having dangerous fits of violence. She stated to
Olle witness that "One morning you are going to wake up and
read "the headlines in the paper of a terrible tragedy," but
repeatedly asked the witness not to mention her statement
to Mrs. Logan. Defendant was at the Logan home on May 29,
1944, the date of the decedent'8 disappearance and death.
Two days later, she and her husband moved into the Logan
home. On or about .Tune 1. 1944. on the pretext that 1\1rs.
Logan had been seriously injured in an automobile accident,
defendant induced Arthur Logan to accompany her to a probation officer. 011 the basis of defendant's statements that
she was Ml'8. Logan '!o: .. f ostel" sister." and that in an insane
rage, ArthUl' Logan had attaekeiJ his wife. bitten her on the
neck and nose, and had bitten defendant on the hand, he was
sent to the psychopathic ward of a count~· hospital. and later
to the Patton State Hospital. Defendant did not mention to
the probation officer that Mrs. l,OgaIl had been shot. Defendant forged Mrs Logan 'f; name to subsequent correspondence with the Patton authorities. Arthur [,ogan became increasingly ill and died on December 6, ]944. At
defendant's direction. hi!> body was given to a medical IIchool
for scientifie purposes.1
In response to inquiries as to Mrs. Logan's whereabouts,
defendant reiterated her statement as to an attack by Arthur
Logan, adding that Mrs. Logan had gone to an institution for
plastic surgery, and that because she was self-conscious about
the disfigurement caused b~' t11e attack, she did not want any of
her friends to see her. Defendant stated on various occasions
that Mrs. Logan had gone to Santa Monica, San Bernardino,
Oregon, "inland," Denver, "back east.," and New York; that
defendant was purchasing the Logan home; that Mrs. Logan

)
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no longer desired the personalty in the home and had told
her to do what she wanted with it; that Mrs. Logan did not
want her car and that defendant had but one more paper
to sign and it would be hers; and that Mrs. Logan intended
never to return to her home.
Defendant lived with her husband ill thc Logan residence
from May 31, 1944, to December 20, 1944, the .date of her
arrest. During this period, she had some of Mrs. Logan's
clothing made over to fit herself, opened Mrs. Logan's mail,
and when necessary answered it in Mrs. Logan's name, had
the interior of the house repainted and various articles of
furniture remodeled, paid incidental bills, gave away and
loaned fine articles of personalty, promised her relatives
Mrs. Logan's diamonds, sold an electric mangle, and used
the Logan car, gas coupons, and food stamps.
Shortly after Arthur Logan's death defendant obtained
forms necessary to make a neath claim for $1,425 owing on
his life insurance policy, and sent them to the Patton au·
thorities with a letter of instruction on which she forged
Mrs. Logan's name. After her arrest, two deeds of gift
that purported to give the Logan property to her were
found in a suitcase under her bed. Defendant t2Stified that
the deeds had been drafted in good faith by her husband
because he felt insecure since they were occupying the
property neither as owners nor as tenants.
It was Mrs. Logan's duty to file monthly parole reports on
defendant's conduct. Defendant wrote all parole reports
from June to December, 1944, and forged 'Margaret Logan'fi
name thereto. Suspicion arose as to their authenticity, and
she was taken into cu.<;tody on December 20, 1944. At the
time of ber arrest, defendant was going through Mrs. Logan'!'
papers. She gave the arresting officers the same explanation
of the decedent's absence that she had previously givell
others. After a brief search the body of Mrs. Logan waf;
found in a shallow grave in the back yard of the Logan resi·
(lence. Defendant had placed a high, solid gate between the
garage and the corner of the house that prevented passage or
view from the driveway to the back yard. The autopsy re·
"caled that a bullet had entered the back of the ncr1\- Imd
:-;truck the fourth cervical vertebra, narrowly missing the
spinal cord, and had passed out of the body below the lcft
jaw. Death was caused by two depressed fractures of thc skull.

J
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Defendant testified that Mrs. Logan was killed by Arthur
Logan in an insane rage on May 29, 1944. She admitted that
the explanation that she had given for Mrs. Logan's disappearance was false, but explained that her conduct after
May 29, 1944, was designed to conceal the death to obviate
suspicion that would be east on her because of her criminal
record. A witness testified that Arthur Logan had bruised
his wife on a previous occasion, and that Mrs. Logan stated
that he was "hard to handle." Defendant testi1ied that at
about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1944, she ran into
the Logan living room in answer to an urgent call from Mrs.
Logan, and found Mr. Logan struggling with and biting his
wife; that the latter was bleeding profusely from wounds
under her eyes, at the end of her nose, and in her neck; that
she later found a piece of flesh that looked like a part of Mrs.
Logan's nose. Examination of Mrs. Logan's body revealed
minor abrasions but no evidence of biting or other injury to
the face or neck. Testimony was given that Arthur Logan had
no natural teeth, and was very feeble and in poor health, as
contrasted to Mrs. Logan, who was ten years his junior and a
strong, heavy woman. Defendant further stated that Arthur
Logan was enraged because he thought he was about to be
sent to an institution for the insane; that after separating
the Logans, defendant refrained from calling the police at
Mrs. Logan's request; that Arthur Logan procured a steak
hammer from the kitchen and struck his wife on the face
and head with it; that she and Mrs. Logan sank to the floor.
she holding the victim's head; that later she sent Mr. Logan to the back· poreb, locking him out, on the pretext of
his watching for Mr. Butler. who was to call for the ironing mangle; that later she heard voices and went to the
door, spoke to Mr. Butler and gave him the mangle. Mr.
Butler's testimony that he telephoned defendant concerning
the mangle severa] days before he called for it and that defendant then informed him that Mrs. Logan had been in an
accident. indicated that when he later called for the mangle
Mrs. L-ogan bad already been dead several days. He testi·
fied further that he walked to the front door of the residenc('
and rang the bell; that a voice from the front bedroom told
him that he would find the mangle outside the back porch
and that nothing else was said; that be saw no one in tlH'
back yard and no one came to the back door.
Defendant testified further thatduI'ing this period she did
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"both the normal and the ahnormal thing"; that she readmitted Mr. Logan; that he again "flicked" Mrs. Logan's
head with the steak hammer; that later Mr. Logan came out
of a bedroom brandishing the defendant's revolver, and
struck Mrs. Logan with it; that defendant then raised Mrs.
Logan from the floor; that the revolver fell to the floor, Mr.
Logan again struck his wife with the steak hammer, and she
again fell to the floor; that defendant, whose clothing was
bloody, now feared calling the police or neighbors, although
Arthur Logan was also covered with blood, and was still
acting in an insane manner; that because blood was coming
out of Mrs. Logan's mouth, defendant turned her 80 that she
lay face down; that Mr. Logan again struck his wife; that
defendant then heard several shots; that defendant was
"paralyzed" at this time in a "semi-kneeling" position.
Defendant's testimony that she heard several shots was COlltrary to evidence that after careful search only one bullet
was found, imbedded in the wall 38% inches from the floor.
Although defendant testified that the decedent was shot by
her husband from a standing position, no bullet hole or ricochet mark was found in the rug or floor where, according
to her testimony, the shooting occurred. Expert testimony
was given that because carbon particles were found two
inches within the bullet wound, the gun must have been
placed against the decedent's neck when fired. Although defendant testified that Mr. Logan struck his wife several times
with the steak pounder, no marks on the skull of deceased
that might have been made by the conical knobs on the instrument were found. Blood and human hair were found,
however, on the revolver, and the butt of the weapon, which
contained a defect, fitted perfectly into the two depressed
fractures of the skull that were the cause of death.
Defendant testified that after the decedent was shot, she
telephoned a doctor to learn how to quiet Mr. Logan, and
following his advice, gave Mr. Logan four sleeping tablets.
The doctor testified that although he did not recall the conversation, he would not in any case have ordered such a dose_
Defendant stated that Mrs. Logan, who because of defendant'!'
fear for her own safety had received no medical attention,
died at 8 o'clock in the evening, and that having determined
to conceal her death, defendant washed the blood off Arthur
Logan, cleaned the blood from. the rug and floor, and buried

/
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the body in the back yard. Concerning the probability that
Mr. Logan would have absolved her had he killed his wife in
an insane rage. rlefendant stated that Mr. Logan did not
remember what occurred during hi8 attack:,; of violence.
Other witnesses testified that although forgetful, he remembered past social affairs and important current events.
The prosecution'~ theory was that the jury could infer
from the foregoing evidence that before the Denton murder
defendant conceived a scheme whereby she could gain wealth
by finding a 'Iuitable victim and acquiring his property by
mnrder; that although the execution of the scheme was
thwarted in the Denton ease. her false statement." while in
prison concerning her prospective wealth were designed to
forestall suspicion that might arise !ilhould she succeed after
parole in a new attempt that she contemplated: that similar
statements. and also statementl'l that Arthur IJogan wal' becoming increasingly violent, made to neighbor!' and friends
of the Logans before the date of the present tragedy. were
designed to lay the groundwork for an attempt to acquire the
Logan property by murdering Mrs. Logan and procuring t.he
recommitment of Arthur Logan; that defendant's inability to
procure fund~ for the escrow deposit in the real estate transaction or to repay the amount of the forged check in all probabilit;r indicated to Mm. [Jogan that defendant'~ financing of
the real estate purchase was fictitious: t.hat the power in Mm.
Logan'R hands to report that defendant had. by committing
the forgery, violated her parole, and to recommend that she
be sent back to the penitentiary was an additional motive
for murder; that on May 29, 1944. defendant in all probability gave Arthur Logan the sleeping tablets before the '
murder. and after he had thus been disposed of. shot the unsuspecting Mm. Logan from behind at close range in an attempt to sever the spinal cord; but that realizing from the
--- Victimi~- actions that she' had missed her mark, -defendant
fractured her skull b)' two blow~ with the butt of the revolver.
Defendant concedes the sufficiency of the e\'idence to sustain the verdict. She contends, however. that there is a general rule against the admissibility of evidence concerning
prior crimes, and that evidence concerning the Denton murder
does not fit into any "exception." [1] It is settled in this
state, however. that except when it shows merely criminal
disposition (People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334, 340 [83 P. 43];
People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 658 [112 P. 281]), evidence
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that iN relevant is not excluded because it reveals the commission of an offense other than that charged. "The general
tests of the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case are:
•.. does it tend logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the people, or to
overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the
defense 1 If it does, then it i~ admis..'1ible, whether it embraces the commi~sion of another crime or does not, whether
the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether it be part
of a single design or not." (People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216,
230 [46 P. 153]: People v. Morani, 196 Cal. 154, 157 r236
P. 135]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 114 [193 P. 921; People
v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334. 340-342 [83 P. 43]; People v. Suesser,
142 Cal. 354, 363 [75 P. 1093]: PeOl)le v. Wilson, 117 Cal.
688, 69] [49 P. 1054]; People v. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 468 [44
P. 1861: People v. Tucker. 104 Cal. 440, 442 183 P 195];
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 517 [36 P. 16]; People v. Rogers
71 Cal. 565. 567 [12 P. 6791: People v. McGilver, 67 Cal. 55,
56 [7 P. 49J: People v. Cunningham, 66 Cal. 668, 671 [4 P.
1144, 6 P. 700. 846] : Peoplf: \'. 'Fitzgerald, 14 Cal.App.2d 180,
202 158 P.2d 7181: People \'. Foster, 79 Cal.App. 328, 333
[24!l P. 2311: Pf'.Ople v. Revley, 67 Cal.App. 553, 562 [227 P.
!l57]: People \'. Klopfer, 61 Ca1.App. 291. 294 [214 P. 878];
People v. Kisp1'. 22 Cal.App. 10. 15 [133 P. 516, 134 P. 346];
People v. 1'ornalt1/. 14 Cal.App. 224. 233-234r 111 P. 513];
Pe,ople v. Rnmla.nd. 12 Cal.App. 6, 19 [106 P. 4281: People v.
"1('.Pher.~on. 6 Cal. App. 266. 270 r91 P. 1098]; see cases cited,
~ Cal..Jur 60. 13 Cal.Jur. 703: Fricke. California Criminal
Evidence. 215: ]3 So.CaI.L.Re'\·. 511. 51a: 2~ Cal.L.Rev. 516:
Rtone. The Rule of Exclusion of Sim~1ar Fact Evidence:
England, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954: Stone. The-Rule -ot- Exclusion
of Sim.ilar 'Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988.)
"It i~ true that in trying a person charged with one offense
it iR ordinarily inadmissible to offer proof of another and distinct offense. but thh~ i~ only because the proof of a distinct
offense ha~ ordinarily no tendency to establish the offense
rharged. But whenever the case is such that proof of one
crime t.end~ to prove any fact material in the trial of another,
surh proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to
prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no
p:l'onnd for its exclusion." People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 141
[32 P. 864]; People v. Ellis, 188 Cal. 682, 689 [206 P. 753) i
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People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 663 [49 P. 1049, 40 L.R.A.
269].)
.
The relevance of evidence that proves crimes other than
that charged, however, must be examined with care. (People
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7J; see Stone,
supra, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 983.) In the present case, the
question of the admissibility of evidence concerning the
Denton murder was submitted to the trial court before
trial, and the court's devision to admit the evidence was
made after extended argument on the part of counsel. Defendant made no request that the jury be admonished at
the time of the admission of the evidence as to its relevance.
The court's instructions,· while not models to be followed,
did not under the circumstances prejudice the defendant.
·"Evidence has been receh-ed in this case concerning the matter of
the alleged death of Jacob C. Denton in the year 1920, and some of
the facts surrounding that transaction including the matter of the
prosecution of this defendant in connection therewith have been
mtroduced in evidence. This evidence was not received and should
not be considered by you as tending to indicate that the defendant is
the kind Qf a person who, because of the commission of another crime,
would be more likely to have committed the crime with which she is
now eharged, and fOI which ahe is now being tried. You must not
consider such evidence for that purpose. If you find from the evidence
relating to the laid Denton tralll!8.ction that the defendant was guilty
of a felonious homicide m connection therewith, you must not permit
this fact to prejudice you against the defendant. This evidence has
been received and is to be considered by you only for one or all of the
following purposes and for no other purpose whatsoever. You may
consider the evidence relating to the Denton transaction for these
purposes only:
"First, for the purpose of determining the motive if any which
actuated the defendant in the commission of the crime of which she
is now charged.
"Secondl for the purpose of determining whether the death of Mar·
garet R. LOgan was the result on the one aide of accident or the
sudden outburst of Mr. Logan, or on the other hand whether the death
of Margarret R. Logan was the result of design upon the part of this
defendant.
"Third, for the purpo~e of determining the identity of the murderer,
if you find that a murder was committed; that is to say, if a murder
were committed did the defendant herself plan and commit the murder,
or was the e1aying accomplished by Mr. Logan, the defendant being
innocent in the transaction.
"Fourth, for the purpose of determining whether the murder of
Margaret R. Logan, if you And the fact to be that she was murdered
by the defendant, was the result of and a ~rt of a general plan or
scheme on the part of the defendant of which the death of Jacob C.
Denton and Margaret R. Logan were both parts.
"Fifth, for the purpose of showing knowledge as a part of criminal
intent, and absence of good faith, in connection with acts of this
defendant prior to, during, and after the death of Margaret It. Logan.
"If :r- hd that the death of Jacob C. DGton ill ~20 waa aecom-
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[2] Since defendant's conviction was based on the theory
that Margaret Logan's death was part of a scheme to acquire
property by murder, proof of such a scheme was essential
to the prosecution's case. Evidence concerning another offense
is relevant to prove that a death resulted from the execution of
a scheme when in the light of the circumstances of the crime
sought to be proved, it indicates the existence of such a scheme.
When a defendant's conduct in connection with the previous
crime bears such similarity in significant respects to his conduct in connection wIth the crime charged as naturally to be
explained as caused by· a general plan, the similarity is not
merely coincidental, but indicates that· the conduct was directed by design. (See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) 202,
275; R. v. Smith, 41 Crim.App.Rep. 229, 236.) In People v.
Lisenba, 14 Cal.2d 403, 427 [94 P.2d 569], this court held
that evidence that a former wife of defendant, whose life he
had insured, had drowned under circumstances tending to
incriminate the defendant, was· admissible to prove that defendant, in the execution of a scheme of insuring and murdering wives, had murdered a second wife, whom he had also
insured, and who also drowned under circumstances pointing
towards defendant's guilt. People v. Gosden, 6 Ca1.2d 14, 24
[56 P.2d 211], held that evidence that a former wife of defendant had died of strychnine poisoning after defendant had
insured her life, was admissible to prove that defendant murdered a second wife, whom he had also insured, and who also
died of strychnine poisoning. In People v. King, 4 Cal.App.2d
727,731 [41 P.2d 593], it was held that evidence that on two
prior occasions the two defendants had burglarized or attempted to burglarize apartments of apartment managers by
a scheme whereby one would burglarize the manager's apartment while the manager was engrossed in conversation with
the other, was admissible to prove that the burglary charged
was committed in the ~ecution of such a scheme. (See, also,
cases cited, People v. King, supra, 4 Cal.App.2d 727, 731 [4]
plished by the defendant for the purpoSt: of enabling her to acquire
the property of l18.id Denton, you have a right to consider the circumstances prior to, during and after that transaction in connection with
the matter!! cd motive, plan or scheme, knowledge, accident or design,
and identity of the perpetrator of the crime charged in the present
information. If, however, you should find that the defendant did not
murder Jacob C. Denton, then the evidence connected with that transaction ahould be disregarded by you, and you &bould reach your verdict
upon the other evidence in this cue alone."
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P.2d 593]; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 530; 2 Wigmore, supra, 275; Fricke,
supra, 224.)
The striking similarity in significant respects between defendant's conduct in the Denton case and her conduct in connection with Mrs. Logan's death strongly indicates a scheme
by defendant to acquire the property of a suitable victim by
murder. In each case, defendant obtained access to the victim's home before the murder and responded to inquiries as
to the decedent's whereabouts by stating that the decedent
had been injured by a third party, that defendant had since
been in touch with decedent, that the decedent had gone to'
one or another part of the country, and had not returned be-,
cause of self-consciousness caused by the injury. Instead of
transferring the decedent's assets to the heirs, in each case
defendant, after decedent's death, treated the decedent's
residence and personal property as her own: She used the:
decedent's automobile and made claims of ownership thereto;
had the decedent's clothing made over for herself or herjl
daughter; gave away or sold personal property of the decedent that she did not want; went through papers belonging!
to the decedent; attempted by forgery to acquire decedent's'
personal property; opened the decedent's mail; stated that
she was going to buy or sell the decedent's residence and'
prepared or had prepared instruments purporting to lease.
or deed the residence to her. After the death of Jacob Denton,!
she stated that he wanted to conceal his affairs from his:
friends and relatives. After Mrs. Logan's death, she stated
that Mrs. Logan intended never to return to her home and'
no longer wanted the personalty therein. In each case, de-,
fendant stated that the decedent was shot while she was on'
the premises, but she did not get in touch with the police.'
In each case, the condition of the decedent's body, buried
under or near his residence, indicated that the method of
killing sought by the assailant was by a bullet from behind
severing the spinal cord at the neck. In each case, defendant
gave a detailed explanation of her unusual conduct fol-'
lowing the disappearance and death of the decedent but
was discredited.
The expiration of a number of years between the Denton'
murder and Mrs. Logan's death is not significant, since
defendant was in the penitentiary until 1939, and was under
the supervision of parole authorities after that year. There,
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was therefore little opportunity for ber to find a suitable
victim before entering into the employ of the Logans.
[3] Since the defendant testified that Mrs. Logan was
killed by her husband, the court properly instructed the
jury that eviden(..~ concerning the Denton case tended to
prove that defendant had a motive for killing Mrs. Logan.
(People v. Gosden, sup1'a,6 Cal.2d 14, 24; People v. Argent08, 156 Ca1. 720, 726 [106 P. 65J; People v. Miller, 121 Cal.
343, 346 [53 P. 816]), and served to rebut her defense. (See
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 517 f36 P. 16]; 13 So.Cal.
L.Rev. 511, 512.)
[4] The instruction that the Denton transaction tended to
identity defendant as the murderer was likewise proper since
the method by which Jacob Denton was murdered, a bullet
from behind severing the spinal cord at the neck, produced
instant death with a minimum of resistance, and tended to
identify defendant as the one who similarly attempted to
sever Mrs. [Jogan's spinal cord. (See 2 'Vigmore, supra,
387.)
[6] The final purpose for which the jury was allowed to
consider evidence concerning the Denton case, to show knowledge and absence of good faith on defendant's part, was also
proper. Since defendant explained that her unusual conduct
following Margaret Logan's death was designed to obviate
suspicion that might be engendered by her criminal record,
evidence that her similar conduct after the murder of Jacob
Denton aided in her conviction for that murder, tended to
prove that she knew the incriminating effect of such conduct,
and that therefore her explanation was false and in bad
faith. (See People v. Whalen, 154 Cal. 472, 476 [98 P. 194],
and cases cited; People v. Gosden, supra, 6 Ca1.2d 14, 24.)
I
[6] Defendant contends that the court erred in admitting
evidence of the Denton murder on the ground that section
1025 of the Penal Code provides that when a defendant who
pleads not guilty has been charged with a previous conviction
and admits the charge, "the charge of the previous conviction
must not be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial." A
previous conviction is charged, however, solely for the information of the court and the prison authorities in determining
the punishment to be imposed in case of conviction. (People
v. Thomas, 110 Cal. 41, 43 [42 P. 456] ; see Pen. Code, §§ 644,
66G, 667, 668, 3025.) This section, as well 88 section 1093 of
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the Penal Code, prevents the circumvention, by reading or
alluding to the admitted charge in the presence of the jury,
of the rules against the admission of evidence of a previous
conviction when such evidence is not relevant or admissible
to impeach. (See People v. Sa.nsome, 84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P.
143] .) It was not designed to exclude relevant evidence n('.
to prevent the impeachment of a witness by proof of COl).
viction of a felony. (People v. Oliver, 7 Cal.App. 601, 60.1
[95 P. 172]; People v. Mullaly, 77 Cal.App. 60, 64 [245 P.
811]; see People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 738 [106 P.
74]; People v. Jeffries, 47 Cal.App.2d 801. 805 [118 P.2d
190].)
[7] The judgment roll in the Denton case, consisting of
the indictment, plea, verdict, proceedings on arraignment for
judgment, and judgment, were introduced over defendant's
objection. The prosecution contends that this record was
admissible as part of the proof that defendant committed a
crime relevant to present issues, in that it renders defendant's
guilt thereof res judicata. (See People v. Majado, 22 Cal.
App.2d 323, 326 [70 P.2d 1015]; 147 A.L.R. 991, 996.) Since,
however, the prosecution made no objection to defendant's
testifying that she did not kill Jacob Denton and that she
did not know whether he was dead, and requested no instruction that his death at defendant's hands was established
asa matter of law, defendant's guilt of Denton's murder was
not treated below as res judicata. The record of the judgment was admissible in any event to impeach defendant's
testimony (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051; People v. Booth, 72
Cal.App. 160, 166 [236 P. 987]), and the court emphasized
in its instructions that this evidence was to be considered for
this purpose.
[8] Although when ,no judgment has been pronounced, a
conviction may be proved by the record of the verdict (People
v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 307 [66 P. 372]), when a judgment
has been rendered, the record thereof establishes the previous conviction beyond dispute, and the record of the earlier
proceedings is cumulative. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1838,
2044; People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 913 [153 P.2d
464].) Defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction
of the record of proceedings preceding the judgment in the
Denton case, however, for these proceedings added little
information to that related in the judgment.
[9] Defendant contends that it was error to admit over
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objection evidence that the Denton case was affirmed on
appeal and to permit the prosecution to elicit this information from her on cross-examination. Affirmation on appeal is relevant, however, to a determination of the weight
to be given a previous conviction. (See People v. Hardwick,
204 Cal. 582, 589 [269 P. 427, 59 A.L.R. 1480].) Such a
conviction may be shown by examination of the witness
to impeach him. (Code Civ. Proc.• § 2051.)
[10] Defendant, while being cross-examined as to her
previous conviction, stated of her own volition that she was
prevented by force from testifying in the Denton case. It is
contended that error was committed in overruling an objection to cross-examination concerning this statement. Although
the prosecution may not, in impeaching a witness by proving a previous conviction inquire as to the merits of the
conviction (People v. David, 12 Cal.2d 639, 646 [86 P.2d
811]; People v. Eldridge, 147 Cal. 782, 786 [82 P. 442];
People v. Chin Hane, 108 Cal. 597, 606 [41 P. 697]), defendant's testimony tended to mitigate the discrediting effect
of the Denton conviction. and could not have been prejudicial.
[11] Defendant contendR that the court erred in excluding a verified petition by Margaret Logan executed in connection with her husband's commitment in November of
1943. The petition recited that Arthur Logan "has threatened to burn down the house, and has also threatened to kill
me and himself. He struck me a week ago with his fist and my
face is still bruised from the assault. He cannot be controlled
or managed and needs supervision and care." The petition
was hearsay and inadmissible to prove that these recitals
were true. (People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 548 [89 P. 124];
People v. Lee, 108 Cal.App. 609. 612 [291 P. 887]; Adkins v.
Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 256 [J.93 P. 251]; see 5 Wigmore, 3'Upra,
76.) Defendant contendR that it was nevertheless admissible
to support her defense that Arthur Logan was the assailant
in that it indicated that Mrs. Logan feared her husband and
believed him dangerous. The petition was offered, however,
before defendant testified that Mr. Logan was the assailant,
and was excluded on the ground that Mrs. Logan's state of
mind toward her husband was not in issue. Although the
right to offer it later without the necessity of an authenticating witness was reserved, the petition was not again offered.
Even if it be assumed that the petition was admissible to
21 c.2d-ll

)

322

)

PEoPLE 11.

PEETE

[28 C.2d

prove Mrs. Logan's state of mind, it is improbable that had
it been admitted the jury would have inferred that Mrs.
Logan feared a murderous attack by her husband. The jury
was informed of the nature of the petition by recitals in a
final judgment admitted in evidence declaring Arthur Logan
insane and ordering his commitment. The judgment recited
that Margaret Logan on November 8, 1943, testified "in regard to the mental condition of said person . . ." and that
on the basis of this testimony and that of two medical examiners, Arthur Logan was found "dangerously mentally
ill," and that unless he was given supervision, he "may endanger health, person and property. . . ." Defendant admitted, moreover, that Mrs. Logan's reason for procuring her
husband's commitment was the hope that he would be cured.
Testimony of other witnesses revealed that Mr. Logan had
been weakened by a major operation, and was very feeble.
Defendant, who was present when the petition was prepared
by a Los Angeles County deputy clerk from statements by
Mrs. Logan, testified that because Mrs. Logan did not know
the procedure. she aided her in procuring the commitment;
that Mrs. Logan told defendant that the bruise on Mrs.
Logan's face, referred to in the petition, was in fact caused
by her husband's tripping her; that Mrs. Logan regretted
filing the petition, wept, and stated that she would never
again place her husband in an institution.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-I diss~t. In my opinion it was error to
admit in evidence the matters pertaining to commission of
the crime of 1920. In view of the volume of this evidence
and the circumstantial nature of the proof as a whole, it
. cannot be said that the defendant was not prejudiced.
It is the settled policy of the law of this state to give effect
to the universally recognized general rule of exclusion under
which a defendant may be tried for no offense other than
that with which he is charged (8 Cal.Jur. § 167, p. 58; People
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 576 [145 P.2d 7]; see, also,
Wharton's Crim. Evidence, §§ 343, 344, pp. 483 et seq.; 20
Am.Jur. § 309, p. 287; 22 C.J.S. § 682, pp. 1084 et seq.) This
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rule and the reasons for it are well stated in the leading case
of People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291 [61 N.E. 286, 293;
62 L,R.A. 193] : "The general rule of evidence applicable to
criminal trials is that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a
foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs
that he is guilty of the crime charged. (1 Bishop's New
erim. Pro. soo. 1120.) This rule, so universally recognized
and so firmly established in all English-speaking lands, is
rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty of the individual
which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all others, at
least from the birth of Magna Charta. It is the product of
that same humane and enlightened public spirit which, speak.
ing through our common law, has decreed that every person
charged with the commission of a crime shall be protected
by the presumption of innocence until he has been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule, and the reasons
upon which it rests, are so familiar to every student of our
law that they need be referred to for no other purpose than to
point out the exceptions thereto. The rule itself has been
stated and discussed in this court in a number of cases.
but we will cite only a few. In People v. Sharp (107 N.Y. 427
[14 N.E. 319, 1 Am.St.Rep. 851]) it was said: "The general
rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense he is
to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is
guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses
in his lifetime is wholly excluded.' In Coleman v. People
(55 N.Y. 81) it is laid down as follows: 'The general rule
is against receiving evidence of another offense. A person
cannot be convicted of one offense upon proof that he committ.ed another, however persuasive in a moral point of view
such evidence may be. It would be easier to believe a person
guilty of one crime if it was known that he had committed
another of a similar character, or, indeed, of any character;
but the injustice of such a rule in courts of justice is apparent.
It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made,
by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to
uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction
for a single once.'
"In People v. Shea (147 N.Y. 78 [41 N.E. 505]) the rule is
thus stated: "The impropriety of giving evidence showing
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that the accused had been guilty of other crimes merely for
the purpose of thereby inferring his guilt of the crime for
which he is on trial may be said to have been assumed and
consistently maintained by the English courts ever since the
common law has itself been in existence. Two antagonistic.
methods for the judicial investigation of crime and the conduct of criminal trials have existed for many years. One of
these methods favors this kind of evidence in order that the
tribunal which is engaged in the trial of the accused may
have the benefit of the light to be derived from a record of his
whole past life, his tendencies, his nature, his associates, his
practices, and in fine all the facts which go to make up the
life of a human being. This is the method which is pursued
in France, and it is claimed that entire justice is more apt
to be done where such a course is pursued than where it is
omitted. The common law of England, however, has adopted
another, and, so far as the party accused is concerned, a much
more merciful doctrine. By that law the criminal is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is made to appear beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury of twelve men. In order to prove
his guilt it is not permitted to show his former character or to
prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the purpose of raising a presumption that he who wolild commit them would be
more apt to commit the crime in question.' • . • The court of
last resort in Pennsylvania thus states the rule: 'It is the
general rule that a distinct crime unconnected with that laid
in the indictment cannot be given in evidence against a prisoner. It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt on the
ground that having committed one crime, the depravity it exhibits makes it likel;r he would commit another. Logically, .
the commission of an independent offense is not proof in itself
of the commission of another crime. Yet it cannot be said to
be without influence on the mind, for certainly if one be
shown to be guilty of another crime equally heinous, it will
prompt a more ready belief that he might have committed
the one with which he llI. charged; it, therefore, predisposes
the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty.' (Shaffner v. Common.wealth, 72 Pa.St. 60 [13 Am.Rep. 649].)"
After thus reviewing the general rule, the court in the
:M:olineux case discusses the applicability of various exceptions, saying: "The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated
with categorical precision. GeneralIy speaking, evidence of
other crimes is competent to prove the speci:fic crime charged
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when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the
absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others;
(5) the identity of the person charged with the commission
of the crime on trial. (Wharton on Crim. Ev. [9th ed.] sec.
48;' Underhill on Ev. sec. 58; Abbott's Trial Brief, Crim.
Trials, sec. 598.)"
First, as to motive, it is pointed out that "in every criminal
trial when proof of motive is an essential ingredient of the
evidence against a defendant, the motive to be established is
the one which induced the commission of the crime charged.
This is too simple for discussion. To hold otherwise would be
to sanction the violation of the general rule under the guise
of an exception to it." In the present case, the motive which
prompted the crime charged, if defendant committed that
crime, W8.q to acquire for herself the property of her victim,
or to prevent the victim from reporting the forgery of the
check or other misconduct. In either case the fact of the 1920
murder was of no probative value in establishing the motive
for the later crime. Because of the large percentage of crime..o;
committed for the purpose of feloniously acquiring property
of another. that ~imilarity of motive alone is not sufficient
to warrant application of the exception to the general rule.
Second, as to intent, which is distinguishable from motive, it
is obvious that proof of an intent to kill Denton in 1920 was of
DI) probative value in establishing an intent to kin another
nt a different time.
Third, under the facts it is clear, and indeed there is no
contention to the contrary, that the exception relating to the
"s hi;ence"of"mista:ke or ~ccident has no application.
Fourth, as to plan or scheme, it is said in the Molineux
case. that "To bring a case within this exception to the general rule which excludes proof of extraneous crimes, there
must be evidence of system between the offense on trial and
the one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as
parts of a general and composite plan or scheme, or they must
be so related to each other as to show a common motive or
intent running through both..•. Some connection between
the crimes must be shown to have existed in fact and in the
mind of the actor, uniting them for the accomplishment of a
common purpose, before such evidence can be received. This
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connection must clearly appear from the evidence. Whether
any connection exists is a judicial question. If the court does
not clearly perceive it, the accused should be given the
benefit of the doubt and the evidence rejected. The minds
of the jurors must not be poisoned and prejudiced by receiving evidence of this irrelevant and dangerous description."
Applying this test to the pre.qent facts, it is seen that there
is no evidence of common purpose, plan; or scheme. At
most the prosecution showed that two isolated murders were
committed, with twenty-four years intervening between them,
for the apparent purpose in each case of securing the victim's property. The death of both victims was not a means
to a single goal.
Lastly, as to the exception covering identity, it is said in
the Molineux case: "There are not many reported cases in
which this exception seems to have been affirmatively applied.
A far larger number of cases, while distinctly recognizing
its existence, have held it inapplicable to the particular facts
then before the court. The reason for this is obvious. In the
nature of things there cannot be many cases where evidence
of separate and distinct crimes, with no unity or connection
of motive, intent or plan, will serve to legally identify the
person who committed one as the same person who is guilty
of the other. The very fact that it is much easier to believe in
the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected
that he has previously committed a similar crime proves the
dangerous tendency of such evidence to convict, not upon the
evidence of the crime charged. but upon the superadded evidence of the previous crime. Hence our courts have been
proverbially careful to subject such evidence to the most
rigid scrutiny, and,have invariably excluded it in cases where
its relevancy and competency was not clearly shown. As was
said in People v. Sharp (107 N.Y. 471 [14 N.E. 319, 1 Am.St.
Rep. 851]) such evidencE' 'tends necessarily and directly to
load the prisoner down with separate and distinct charges' of
past crime, which it cannot be supposed he is or will be in
proper condition to meet or explain, and which necessarily
tend to very gravely prejudice him in the minds of the jury
upon the question of his guilt or innocence.' Such evidence
gives opportunity for the conviction of an accused person upon
mere prejudice instead of by evidence showing the actual
commission of the crime for which a defendant is on trial.
It eompels a defendant to meet an accusation not charged in
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the indictment, which he might successfully refute if given
the opportunity to do so, unembarrassed by other issues." In
the present case the defendant was admittedly at the scene of
the murder. The only issue wa...c:; whetller it was she or Mr.
Logan who struck the blows and fired the fatal shot. How evidence of the 1920 crime could prove her identity rather than
that of Mr. Logan as the murderer is obscure. unless it can
be said that the two crimes show a ('ommon plan or scheme.
But. as already stated, no common plan appears other than
perhaps a purpose to feloniously acquire property of the
victim, and that is not a sufficient connection to justify
application of the exception to the general rule.
The development of the law in this state shows a departure
from the early restrictions governing the application of exceptions to the general rule as defined in the Molineux case.
This is evidenced by decisions such as People v. Lisenba, 14
Ca1.2d 403 f94 P.2d 569], and cases there reviewed (see disRenting opinion reported in volume 89 2d of the Pacific Reporter at page..c:; 54-108). Tn my opinion the pendulum haH
RWUDg too far to the side of admissibility. The restrictions
Rhould be reappraised and given effect. As said in People v.
Albertson., 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 f145 P.2d 7] : "The trial court,
however, should be guided by the rule that such proof is to be
received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the
crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to bE'
resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the
minds of t.he jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact.
carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt."
(See, also, People v. mass, ]58 Cal. 650 f112 P. 281]; People
v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379. 3$7-390 [34 P. 856]; People v. Darby,
64 Cal.App.2d 25 [148 P.2d 281; 13 Ca1.Jur. § 84, p. 707;
8 Cal.Jur. § 168, p. 61.)
An indication of the policy of this state to adhere to a limited application of the exceptions to the general rule is found
in section 1025 of the Penal Code, enacted in 1874, which provides that when a defendant who pleads not guilty has becn
charged with a previous conviction and admits the charge.
"the charge of the previous conviction must not be read to the
jury, nor alluded to on the tria!''' Although, as the majority
opinion notes, this statute, as construed and applied, does not
exclude relevant evidence, or prevent the impeachment of a
witness by proof of conviction of a felony, nevertheless thi!':
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court just recently took occasion to comment at length on the
prejudice which is thrust upon any defendant charged with
crime who has been previously convicted of a felony (People
v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478, 494 [165 P.2d 3]). So far as
possible the settled policy underlying the enactment should
be given effect (see People v. Sansome, 84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P.
143]; People v. Hobbs, 37 Ca1.App.2d 8. 11 f98 P.2d 775]),
and the application of exceptions to the general rule should be
confined to the narrow field laid down in early cases.
The issue of remoteness is an important one. The proximity of the offense charged to the prior offense sought to be
introduced in evidence is universally considered by the courts
in determining whether such evidence is admiRSible (63
A.L.R. 602; 22 C.J.S. §§ 683-689, pp. 1089-1111; 1 Wharton'!!
Criminal Evidence (11th ed.) § 361, p. 569; 8 Cal.Jur. § 170,
p. 65). Generally it must appear that the evidence of other
offenses relates to acts that occurred shortly before, or shortly
after, the commission of the offense for which the accused is
being tried. However, no definite time limit can be fixed,
and the matter rests largely in the discretion of the court.
The California Jurisprudence text writer l'Itates: "In regard
to the distance of time between the principal fact and the
collateral fact to be shown in proof of knowledge or intent.
no precise rule can be established so far as the admissibility
of the evidence is concerned. If the principle upon which thiq
evidence is introduced is the doctrine of chances or probabilities, the remoteness of such occurrences in point of time goes
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. In
such cases, if the evidence has any application under the rule.
whether or not it has sufficient weight to entitle it to be submitted to the jury is a question for the trial court. The question must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the
judge who tries the case." (8 Cal.Jur. § 170, p. 66.)
Under this rule, it appears that in this case the mere fact
of extreme remoteness did not compel the exclusion of evidence of the prior offense by the trial judge. However, when it
is considered that twenty-four years elapsed between the two
crimes, eighteen of which were spent by the defendant in
prison with ample time for reflection, it is at least arguable
that even had she originally intended to murder a second victim, she would hardly have planned to carry out the crime
by the same method which had resulted so disastrously for her
in the first instance. In other words, the fact of remoteness,
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considered with all of the other facts in this case, negatives
any common plan and supports the conclusion that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the
prior offense.
In my opinion the defendant should be retried on evidence confined to the commission of the offense with which
she is here charged.
For the foregoing reason I would reverse the judgment.
Appelant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 2,
1946. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

